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CHAPTER 1 
PRELUDE TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corruption has crippled many economies, with developing countries being the hardest hit and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland being no exception. The government of Swaziland loses millions monthly 
through corruption and the figure has been rising over the years as the economic crisis has been 
worsening. There is evidence that some of the funds are looted by way of grand corruption. The 
government is supposed to be doing something, but seemingly its response is not adequate, for 
the monthly losses are rising. 
This research paper analyses the strategies employed by the government to hold accountable its 
upper echelons for corrupt practices. It seeks to raise questions as to why the state is failing to 
prevent corruption and why it cannot combat it. Also, it will propose ways in which grand corruption 
in Swaziland may be prevented and combated. 
1.2 Background to the problem 
Three years after the 2008 economic crisis, many countries are still recuperating. However, instead 
of improving, the economy of Swaziland is plummeting. The government is barely coping and has 
been faced with a severe fiscal crisis for some time.1 It has been attempting in vain to secure loans 
to weather the crisis. Threats have been made to cut the salaries of the civil service to mitigate the 
austere economic conditions.2 However, the civil servants are unwilling to down the bitter pill, 
arguing that they would rather have the budget for royalty reduced.3 They allege that the economic 
crisis would not be alleviated by salary cuts for it is a deep-rooted problem that needs long-term 
solutions.4 Also, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been reluctant to support more funding 
to ailing Swaziland through an African Development Bank loan, positing that the crisis is best 
                                                            
1
 IMF Press Release 11/186 (18 May 2011).   
2
 Newstime Africa (16 March 2011). 
3
 Phakathi (9 November 2010). 
4
 SADOCC (20 March 2011).  
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tackled internally first, for more loans will not help the government unless it learns to manage its 
funds.5 
Many factors have contributed to the limping economy of Swaziland, with corruption being 
prominent amongst them. The government has acknowledged that corruption has ravaged and 
adversely affected the struggling economy.6 The revenue of Swaziland is composed mainly of 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) receipts, which saw a huge decline last year, thereby 
contributing significantly to the economic crisis.7 In addition, the Minister of Finance, Majozi Sithole, 
has alluded time and again to the fact that the government was losing E40 million monthly through 
corruption and now this amount had doubled.8 In his fiscal budget speech of 2011/2012, he 
reported that government was losing E80 million through corruption.9 More alarming was his 
assertion that this corruption disease had crept into cabinet.10 Sadly, the statement by the Minister 
of Finance was not made without justification.  
Sadly again, corruption by high level officials is most crippling since it invariably takes the form of 
grand corruption. When senior officials take, there is a huge impact on national resources. Some 
evidence of this element of corruption has been revealed already and more cases are being 
brought to light.  
Also, the position of Swaziland in Transparency International‟s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
has not been improving but has been dropping. From a stagnant 3.6 since 2008, which in itself is 
not impressive, its rating dropped to 3.2 in 2010.11 The CPI rates countries on a scale from 10, 
                                                            
5
 Dlamini (24 February 2011). 
6
 „Director of Public Prosecution‟ available at http://www.gov.sz.  
7
 IMF Press Release 11/186 (18 May 2011). 
SACU is a regional trade block amongst five SADC countries, viz, Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Namibia. It aims at enhancing the economic development of the member States. The revenue is calculated using a 
specific formula based on the customs, excise and development components. (Available at http://www.sacu.int/ ). 
The SACU receipts of Swaziland fell by 11 per cent resulting in a 14.3 per cent deficit in the GDP for the fiscal year 
ending March 2011.   
8
 Sithole (2011: 4). It must be noted that the currency of Swaziland is emalangeni (E) and is on par with the South African 
rand (R). 
9
 Sithole (2011: 4). 
10
 Sithole (2011: 4). 
11
 „Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index‟ (2008-2010). 
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which denotes the cleanest country, to 0 which denotes the highly corrupt. Denmark, Singapore 
and New Zealand were at the top of the list in 2010 at 9.3 while at the bottom was Somalia with a 
score of 1.1.12 In 2010, with a score of 3.2, Swaziland ranked number 91 out of 123.13 
In tackling corruption, Swaziland has used a multifaceted approach. The three arms of government 
have all been involved in the fight against corruption. At the centre of the strategy is a formally 
independent body, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). Realising that this is a newly formed 
body that will have teething problems, the state has made use of other avenues, including ad hoc 
Commissions. In some instances, the King himself has been involved.  
One would expect that with such efforts and with all the branches of government harnessed to 
combat this disease, corruption would be a thing of the past in Swaziland. However, as suggested 
above, it clearly is not. Instead, the trend of corruption has been on the rise. It is in this context that 
the study seeks to assess the adequacy of the approach against corruption by the state and how it 
may be improved. 
1.3 Research questions and objectives of the study 
Since the government has realised that a significant portion of its funds is lost through corruption, 
the study aims to understand what it has done to alleviate the problem. The paper raises the 
following questions: 
 What methods are being employed by the state in response to corruption?  
 Could these methods be blamed for the exacerbation of the crime of corruption?  
 The Kingdom of Swaziland may have avenues for combating corruption but if these are 
toothless, the battle is far from being won. The economy is collapsing and corruption is 
significantly to blame. What can Swaziland do to alleviate this problem? 
In this regard, the paper takes an expository approach to reveal the cases of corruption that have 
been reported by the local newspapers in Swaziland. The aim is to render visible the magnitude of 
grand corruption and to analyse the state‟s response thereto. It is only by studying the state‟s 
                                                            
12
 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2010). 
13
 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2010). 
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response to each of the individual cases to be discussed that the overall approach of the state can 
be comprehended. This approach will assist also in identifying the shortcomings of the government 
in its approach to preventing and combating corruption. Conclusions will be drawn on the 
effectiveness of the system adopted and recommendations will be made on how best the system 
may be improved. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
Corruption is a buzz word in Swaziland. Some are ambivalent about its presence because of 
ignorance of the situation and the lack of prosecutions, while others are left wondering why 
prosecutions are not being carried out because corruption is self-evident. Either way, the failure to 
prosecute corruption does not mean that it does not exist. 
The existence of a body such as the ACC shows acknowledgement of the penetration of corruption 
in the economy and constitutes evidence that efforts are being made to prevent or combat it. 
Nonetheless, reports indicate that instead of the situation getting better, it is getting worse by the 
day. Questions arise as to how this could be happening despite the existence of the ACC as well 
as a body of anti-corruption legislation.  
The study is necessary to collect the cases of grand corruption that have been randomly reported 
in the print media and consolidate them in one document to show the existence and extent of the 
problem in Swaziland. It is crucial to analyse the approach of the state in tackling corruption and 
the anti-corruption measures it has employed. It is through understanding the mandate of the ACC 
and the adequacy of the legislative framework that we can comprehend the reasons for the 
escalating rate of corruption and how best Swaziland can improve its efforts to bring to justice 
those responsible for the crime.  
Thus, the study will contribute to identifying the loop-holes in the criminal justice system and 
contribute to their rehabilitation through the recommendations that it will propose. It will be an 
academic exercise in classifying the different scenarios encountered as forms of grand corruption 
to explicate further the concept of corruption in relation to the case of Swaziland. This will enable a 
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scholar in Swaziland to relate to and appreciate the concept in a richer way. Hence, the research 
will be an addition to the scanty literature available on Swaziland.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
The study will be qualitative and library-based. It will be a critical-analytical reading of the primary 
sources to be consulted. These include the different types of cases of corruption reported in the 
media, the few decided cases, the legislative framework, as well as the documents of the bodies 
responsible for anti-corruption efforts in Swaziland. Also, the study will attempt an assessment of 
Swaziland‟s compliance with international standards, to which end international anti-corruption 
instruments will be analysed as well. 
The research will rely also upon academic publications which include books, journal articles and 
commentaries for analyses and knowledge of the concept of grand corruption and measures to 
alleviate it. 
1.6 Scope of the study 
Corruption takes many forms. However, the focus of the study will be on grand corruption, since 
politicians take without regard to the effects it has on the „overall pie of the economy‟.14 Hence, the 
research will concern itself with how Swaziland has responded to the evil of grand corruption and 
its dire effects on the economy, both as regards preventing and combating it. The study identifies 
the different pillars that constitute the anti-corruption integrity system. However, it is restricted 
analytically to the ACC as the foundation of the anti-corruption integrity system. 
1.7 Preliminary chapter framework 
The study consists of four more chapters. Chapter two will be a definitional chapter, attempting to 
define the concept of corruption, in particular grand corruption and its constituent elements. It will 
give practical examples in relation to Swaziland to demonstrate how the constituent elements of 
grand corruption are manifested.  
                                                            
14
 Hope (2000:1). 
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Having established the presence and extent of corruption, the response of the state to it will be 
assessed. The third chapter will be an analytical journey into the present anti-corruption legislative 
framework and the role of the pillars of the anti-corruption system in the fight against grand 
corruption. The fourth chapter will contain an assessment of the response of the state to grand 
corruption, with particular reference to the ACC. A summary of the findings and the author‟s 
conclusions on the findings will be made in the fifth chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION 
 
‘Corruption, like an elephant, is difficult to describe but not difficult to 
recognise when observed.’ – Vito Tanzi
15
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Many scholars and legal instruments have defined the term corruption, albeit differently. Hence, 
there is no universally accepted definition of corruption and it is unlikely that consensus will be 
reached in this regard.16 However, this chapter reviews the legal and academic literature to 
develop a suitable definition of corruption for the research while also making specific reference to 
the notion of grand corruption. It will give the constituent elements of grand corruption and cite 
practical examples in Swaziland. Also, this chapter will highlight the possible effects grand 
corruption has on the economy of Swaziland. 
2.2 Attempts at defining corruption 
Corruption is a chameleon-like term that changes in relation to the context in which it is used. What 
one society may view as corrupt, another may not. It is the indignation and disgust towards the 
practice, as shaped by the moral values of the society, which will determine a corrupt practice in 
that society. Hence, it has been difficult to settle upon a universally accepted definition of the term 
and various legal instruments have tended to define the term differently. However, common 
amongst them is agreement on what constitutes corruption. 
Due to the controversies of the definition of corruption, the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) has opted not to define the term. Instead, it lists the constituent crimes of 
corruption, including bribery and embezzlement in the public and private sectors, trading in 
influence, illicit enrichment, abuse of functions, laundering of criminal proceeds and concealment.17  
                                                            
15
 Tanzi (1998: 564). 
16
 De Maria (2005: 6). 
17
 Khemani (2009: 4). 
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Choosing a somewhat more modest approach, the African Union Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating Corruption (AU Convention) defines corruption as acts and practices, including 
related offences, proscribed in the Convention.18 The acts proscribed in the AU Convention include 
soliciting and accepting bribes, granting or offering of bribes, illicit enrichment and laundering of 
corruption proceeds by a public official or any person in exchange for an undue advantage.19 The 
SADC Protocol against Corruption has defined corruption to include: 
bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the 
public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, private employees, 
independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue 
advantage of any kind for themselves or others.
 20 
The Swaziland Prevention of Corruption Act of 2006 (POCA) also gives a list of offences that 
constitutes corruption in its Part III.21 It further defines what corruption entails in general, providing 
that a corrupt act would be accepting a benefit or giving an advantage by one person, acting in 
dishonesty, to another in the carrying out of his or her public duties.22 
Common to all these definitions is the idea that corruption entails, as bodies like Transparency 
International define it, „the abuse of entrusted power for private gain‟.23 This definition has been 
widely cited and accepted. It encapsulates all the offences of corruption in simpler terms. Thus, in 
essence and in the context it is to be understood in this paper, corruption is the utilisation of official 
positions and titles for personal or private gain at the expense of the public and in violation of the 
established rules and ethical considerations.24  
 
 
 
                                                            
18
 Art 1 of the AU Convention. 
19
 Art 4 of the AU Convention. 
20
 Art 1 of the SADC Protocol against Corruption. 
21
 Like the international instruments, the list of offences include bribery, offences with regard to contracts and tenders, 
corrupt transactions by or with public or private bodies, conflicts of interests, possession of property without reasonable 
explanation, amongst others.   
22
 Art 42 of POCA. 
23
 Transparency International „Defining corruption‟. 
24
 Hope (2000: 18).  
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2.3 Grand corruption 
This term is used to describe cases where senior public officials derive wealth from state funds 
using corrupt means.25 Adopting the formula developed by Klitgaard in defining corruption; grand 
corruption may be defined as: 
  GC (Grand corruption) = M (Monopoly power) + D (Discretion) – A (Accountability). 26  
The senior officials normally have monopoly and discretionary powers over decision-making and 
are not accountable for their decisions. Hence, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) 
defines grand corruption as that type of corruption which takes place at the policy formulation end 
of politics.27 Such officials, in the abuse of their positions, pursue their private interests by granting 
preferential treatment to certain individuals who will collaborate with them at the expense of the 
interests of society.28 Igbinedion distinguishes it from other forms of corruption by the scale of 
wealth appropriated by the officials and their seniority in the hierarchy of the civil service.29  
Grand corruption is rampant where government trades with the private sector.30 The high officials, 
who are normally ministers, leaders of government departments or, better still, heads of state, have 
discretionary power over the granting of large public contracts. Hence, they will require payment or 
commission before approving major purchases and developments.31  
Moody-Stuart states that the motivation to engage in grand corruption for top officials lies in three 
factors. First, „the size of the project will mean that the bigger the project, the bigger the slice to 
take home‟.32 Consequently, sometimes, projects not necessary for development will be approved 
but not seen to fruition. Even where they are necessary, they will be left unfinished for the funds 
would have been exhausted unproductively before completion. For them to be completed there will 
be need to dig into national funds again, thereby depleting them further. This pattern has seen 
                                                            
25
 Nicholls et al (2006: 3). 
26
 Khemani (2009: 5) 
27
 U4 „Grand Corruption‟. 
28
 Lambsdorff (2007: 82). 
29
 Igbinedion (2009: 58). 
30
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
31
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
32
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
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more governments approving supplementary budgets they can barely afford, further draining their 
economies.  
Second, the immediacy of the rewards is luring.33 Politicians know that their terms of office may be 
brief, so they need a source that will guarantee immediate payment once the funds are released.34 
With grand corruption, such payment is always guaranteed.  
Last, mystification also plays a role.35 „The more technical a transaction, the less likely that 
questions will be asked'.36 A high technological content, therefore, will be attractive because it 
makes a price comparison difficult.37 This has made military, aviation and telecommunication 
projects the most attractive as sources of corrupt funds. 
2.3.1 Corrupt acts involved in grand corruption 
Almost all the corrupt acts proscribed by many conventions and statutes, whichever way they 
describe them, are consonant with grand corruption. The most prevalent offences in Swaziland 
criminalised by POCA are embezzlement or diversion of funds38, trading in influence39 and abuse 
of functions. Additionally, section 31 of POCA includes „offences in respect of corruption relating to 
politicians‟ that consolidate the above offences and makes reference to grand corruption.40 Section 
31 provides as follows: 
A person who, directly or indirectly – 
 
(a) Being a politician, demands or accepts or agrees or offers to accept any 
advantage from another person, whether for the of that politician or for the benefit 
if any other person; or 
(b) Gives or agrees or offers to give any advantage to a politician, whether for the 
benefit of that person of for the benefit of another person, in order for that 
politician or that other person to act or to influence another person to act, in a 
manner, 
(c) That amounts to the – 
                                                            
33
 Nicholls et al (2006: 3). 
34
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
35
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
36
 Nicholls et al (2006: 3). 
37
 Moody-Stuart G „Grand corruption in third world countries‟. 
38
 Section 24 of POCA. The offence is described as „cheating the public revenue‟. 
39
 Section 22 of POCA. The offence is described as „offences with regard to contracts and tenders‟. 
40
 The Act lists politicians as Senators, Members of Parliament, Regional Administrator, King‟s Advisory Counsellors, 
Municipal Councillors, Chiefs and chiefs‟ Councillors.  
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(i) Illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, biased; or 
(ii) Misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course of the 
exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions 
arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal 
obligation 
(d)  That amounts to the – 
(i) Abuse of a position of authority, 
(ii) A breach of trust, or 
(iii) The violation of a legal duty or a set of rules;  
(e) Designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
(f) That amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do 
anything, 
Commits an offence of corrupt activities relating to politicians. 
This is not to exclude illicit enrichment41 and laundering of the proceeds of corruption.42 Also, akin 
to grand corruption is kleptocracy, defined as a situation where leaders take money from state 
funds for their personal benefit or anyone close to them without regard for the economic system 
and welfare of their citizens.43 
A discussion of each of the acts common in Swaziland will ensue with illustrations to elucidate the 
gravity of the situation. It is through the response of the state to these cases and others that the 
adequacy of its anti-corruption system will be assessed later on. 
2.3.2 Diversion of property 
Diversion of property may be through embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, theft or fraud. 
Langseth argues that in the context of corruption, diversion of property will entail the illicit 
appropriation of money, property or valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them, but 
has access to them due to his or her position or employment.44 In such instances, the person will 
acquire the property through legal means but will divert it for his or her benefit in an illegal 
manner.45  
                                                            
41
 Section 34 of POCA. The offence is described as „possession of property, e.t.c. without reasonable explanation‟. 
42
 Section 41 of POCA. The offence is described as „money laundering‟. 
43
 Hartman (1997: 157). 
44
 Langseth (2006: 11). 
45
 Fontaye (2004: 173). 
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The greatest episode of embezzlement and fraud, that sent shock waves throughout Swaziland 
and attracted the attention on the international community, was the E50 million scandal in 2007.46 
The 19 suspects, who were either top government employees or close to the King, have been 
released on bail.47 They are alleged not only to have embezzled the capacity-building initiative 
funds which were to empower locals in business establishment and administration, but also to 
have exceeded the government limit that was to be spent on such exercise, which was E10 
million.48 
It is unlikely that this case will ever go to trial. The arrests were made on the strength of 
recommendations of a report of the Commission of Inquiry that uncovered the fraud. The 
investigations by the police were poorly conducted and there was not sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case. The assets that were seized have been released to the suspects. 
Citizens who were beneficiaries of the fund were short-changed of its benefits and the culprits were 
never held accountable. 
In 2010, another high profile case arose in which the Central Transport and Administration General 
Manager, Polycarp Dlamini, Industrial Court Judge President, Sifiso Nsibande and others were 
charged with 24 counts of fraud, corruption and money laundering.49 They are alleged to have 
defrauded government of E24 million and the prosecution is expected to call 135 witnesses to 
make its case. The case is pending and will continue in February 2012, to enable the prosecution 
to conduct more investigations. The suspects are currently out on bail.  
2.3.3 Trading in influence 
Trading in influence is a bribe-like offence that is committed though a tripartite agreement. An 
instigator will offer an undue advantage to a public official to abuse his influence to obtain an 
                                                            
46
 S v Qhawe Mamba, Thembani Simelane, Musa Fakudze & Others unreported HC case no 42 of 2007. The suspects 
include: the former Principal Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, Musa Fakudze; the former Examinations Council 
Registrar, Dr Ben Dlamini; the King‟s former praise man and Channel Swazi boss, Qhawe Mamba; finance ministry 
official, Nonhlanhla Dlamini; and author, Sebenzile Tango. 
47
 Mamba (9 November 2007). 
48
 United States Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Swaziland (2008). 
49
 S v Polycarp Dlamini, Sifiso Nsibande, Sandile Dlamini  and Another unreported HC Case No 148 of 2010.  
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undue benefit from a public or administrative authority.50 Trading in influence is common in 
government procurement procedures. The public official who abuses his office will be privy to 
information that outsiders have no access to, for example, access to terms on government 
decision-making.51  The benefit will be two-fold. The public official will peddle his influence to derive 
an undue advantage from a government authority for the benefit of a third party and the third party 
will grant him or her an undue benefit in return. Rose-Ackerman states that many trading-in-
influence scandals will be prevalent where the tendering process is overruled by rent-seeking 
officials or is unregulated.52 
A company owned by the Swazi Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Nelisiwe 
Shongwe, was accused of tender irregularities early in 2011. Upon auditing the Auditor-General‟s 
report of 2009, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) reported that the Minister allegedly colluded 
with the regional government accountant who awarded her company, Jenny Investments (PTY) 
Limited, a contract for which she had not tendered.53  
In the report tabled before Parliament, the PAC alleged that the regional committee had concluded 
the tender-awarding decision but the regional accountant-general reversed the decision and 
awarded the tender to the Minister‟s company, thereby flouting procurement procedures.54 The 
tender was for the construction of boreholes; instead, Jenny Investment (PTY) Limited changed the 
order to that of purchasing plumbing material.55 Such plumbing material was delivered 13 months 
after payment was made to the company, despite the rule that, for government tenders, payment is 
made after delivery.56 To conceal the corruption, the Minister instructed Manzi Drillers to build the 
borehole under the pretext that it was a generous gesture from her company.57 The outcome of the 
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investigations by the PAC was that the Minister had indeed colluded with the regional accountant 
and the matter was transmitted to the ACC for further investigation.58 
In another tender case, a company owned by the Minister of Natural Resources and Energy, 
Princess Tsandzile Dlamini, has left the public perplexed as to how it got the sole rights to 
distribute blank plates for the new SADC registration plates. The company, Eco-Rev Distributors, 
was owned by the Minister, who had a 44% shareholding. Her husband, also a senior government 
employee as Under-Secretary to Ministry of Education, holds 50% of the shares and one Richard 
Gwebu holds 6% of the shares.59 The contract is estimated to be worth E10 million.60 
The company sells the plates, which are bought at around E30 in South Africa, at double the price 
(for E65) to the embossers,61 who print the plates and sell them to the public. By the time the public 
purchases the plates, the price is obviously exorbitant. There is still a public outcry about how the 
company was given a monopoly over the plate distribution and how a politician could compete with 
other businesses in the award of a government tender. 
When questioned on how the Minister could be tendering for a government contract, the husband 
claimed that his wife had resigned from the company.62 The SADC registration plates programme 
was implemented in June 2010 and the Minster is alleged to have resigned from the company 
three months after its commencement, in September 2010.63 However, that does not negate the 
fact that politicians are expected not to tender for government projects as they might resort to 
peddling influence.  
Even so, politicians were resolute in trading with government. In a parliamentary debate on the 
Procurement Bill of 2010, the Minister of Finance had difficulty convincing parliamentarians that 
politicians were expected not to tender for government projects due to the influence they have.64 
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His concerns were disregarded as the Bill was sent for assent without a clause prohibiting 
politicians from tendering for government contracts.65 It was, however, not assented to and brought 
back for debate with a clause that politicians were not to tender for government contracts inserted 
as section 60(2).66 In this regard, many MPs absented themselves from the sitting and the Bill 
could not be debated because a quorum was not reached.67 Parliamentarians have lost sight of the 
fact that cabinet ministers are also politicians who are wielding monopoly and discretionary powers 
in procurement procedures. Whenever there are business tenders to be awarded they are likely to 
influence the tendering process.  
2.3.4 Abuse of functions 
The crime of abuse of functions is committed when a public official performs or omits to perform an 
act in the discharge of his or her duties for the purposes of obtaining an undue advantage for 
himself or herself, a third party or an entity.68 Snider and Kidane assert that abuse of functions will 
be any act by a public official in the carrying out of his or her duties illicitly to gain an advantage 
that may accrue to him- or herself or another.69 Thus, an official may abuse his functions to ensure 
that the result of such abuse will afford him- or herself or a third party an undue advantage. At 
times, an omission, for instance, intentional failure to monitor compliance with some laws, may 
amount to abuse of functions.  
In a scandal that caused a rage of words in the media between the Minister of Public Works and 
Transport, Nthuthuko Dlamini, and MP Robert Magongo, it was revealed how the latter was 
allegedly abusing his functions in the consideration of an award of a tender of E30 million for the 
supply of earth-moving equipment to the government.70 The MP, who is chairman of the Parliament 
                                                            
65
 Shaw (8 July 2011).  
Though it was not stated expressly that politicians may conduct business with government, it was not excluded expressly 
either. Section 39(1) of the Procurement Bill of 2010 states that „a tenderer may not be not be excluded from participating 
in public procurement on the basis of nationality, race, religion, gender or any other criterion not related to its eligibility or 
qualifications except to the extent provided for in the Act or procurement regulations‟.   
66
 Sukati (19 August 2011).  
67
 Sukati (19 August 2011). 
68
 Art 19 of UNCAC. 
69
 Snider & Kidane (2007: 725). 
70
 Magagula (3 July 2011). 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Portfolio Committee on Public Works and Transport, is alleged to have preferred a South African 
company supplying refurbished equipment, over local ones supplying new equipment.71  
Barloworld, the local company, accused the MP of soliciting about E8 400, which he claimed would 
be the subsistence allowance for a team of 10 Committee members he was to lead to inspect a 
sister branch in South Africa.72 The company further alleged that Magongo had requested that it 
pay an unspecified amount for food and accommodation for the Portfolio Committee as an 
incentive, as the Committee had been to South Africa to inspect the premises of another 
company.73 The Minister of Public Works and the Principal Secretary to the same ministry 
dissociated themselves from any of the MP‟s actions, stating that no one had mandated him to find 
suppliers on behalf of government.74  
The MP may not have succeeded in his quest to derive an undue advantage but allegedly he did 
abuse his functions. Section 39 of POCA criminalises an attempt to commit any of the offences 
proscribes in the Act. Thus legal action ought to have been taken against the Minister. The Minister 
of Public Works and Transport only promised to probe the matter.75 
The Prime Minister and five other Ministers have been involved in yet another scandal, a land 
scam that attracted attention internationally and that illustrates abuse of functions. In this scam, 
however, the Minister for Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Pastor Lindiwe Dlamini, who 
abused her functions, derived no benefit but did it for third parties.  
The land in question is regulated by the Crown Land Disposal Regulations of 2003. In terms of 
Schedule 1 of the Regulations, only low income earners are eligible to apply to purchase the land 
at discounted prices and the applicant‟s purchasing power should be traceable. The Prime Minister 
bought a portion of the land at a 50 per cent discount while the Ministers were given 30 per cent 
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discounts.76 Effectively, the Prime Minister bought land measuring 6 084 square metres, which is 
valued at E608 000, for E304 000.77 In terms of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Regulations, high income 
earners should pay the full price of the land. Thus, the approval of the sale by the Minister of HUD 
suggests that the Prime Minister is a low income earner. On the contrary, the Prime Minister is not 
a low income earner; hence he and his fellow colleagues robbed the Swazi citizenry of the 
opportunity of becoming land owners. 
Parliament realised the fallacy in the judgment of the Minister for HUD and requested her to table a 
report, in which she confirmed the above facts. Parliament then convened a Land Selection 
Committee to probe the matter further. Indeed, the matter was probed and before the Committee 
could table its report in Parliament, the Prime Minister applied to court for an interdict ordering the 
Committee to refrain from tabling the report.78 Parliament, in complete defiance of the interdict, 
went ahead and debated the matter, claiming that it was seized of the matter first. Hence, 
Parliament argued that the courts should allow it to finalise the matter.79 Such action created a 
constitutional crisis.  
The King intervened to harmonise the three arms of government. In this intervention, he issued a 
directive that Parliament stop any debate surrounding the land sale and that the Prime Minister and 
the Ministers should return the land.80 The Prime Minister was directed also to withdraw any court 
process that was pending.81 The King‟s directive finalised the matter. The land was to be returned 
and Parliament was silenced. However, whoever had attempted to derive or actually derived any 
undue benefit in this incident of abuse of functions was never held accountable. 
2.3.5 Kleptocracy 
Kleptocracy is grand corruption on a grand scale. Former US President, George W. Bush, once 
described it as a grave and corrosive abuse of power which represents the most invidious type of 
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corruption.82 Kleptocracy is the plundering of state funds by a ruler, his immediate family and 
associates with the aim of enriching themselves at the expense of the general population.83 
Kleptocratic leaders have no regard for the welfare of society and are interested only in enriching 
themselves. Hence, Grean asserts that the tendency of kleptocratic leaders is that they favour 
policies that transfer most of the resources to their pockets, leaving the entire population 
destitute.84  
Swaziland has been warned by the IMF of reckless expenditures on its budget and a huge wage 
bill. To decrease its expenditure, a Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR) was designed, which will 
see the government, inter alia, cutting down the civil service, and reducing and freezing salaries for 
the next three years. Surprisingly, the Royal Emoluments and Civil List budget has been left 
untouched. According to the Royal Emoluments and Civil List Act of 1992 (as amended in 1998) 
the yearly sum of E15 million shall be allocated in the national budget for the upkeep of royalty for 
a decade after 199885 and shall be charged from the consolidated fund.86 The consolidated fund is 
financed by shares which the government owns in big investor companies in the country, such as 
Swaziland Royal Sugar Corporation and MTN.  
The royalty of Swaziland has been known for lavish spending. Five of the King‟s thirteen wives 
were sent on a E45 million shopping extravaganza around the world in 2009.87 Earlier that year, 
the King had bought 20 armoured Mercedes Benz vehicles, each with a market value of E1,6 
million, to ferry the dignitaries who had attended the 40/40 celebrations.88   
In the 2010/11 budget, government had set aside E170 million for royal upkeep and for 2011/2012, 
E210 million have been set aside.89 Both budgets are very much more than the E15 million 
stipulated in the Royal Emoluments and Civil List Act and there has been no decrease in the 
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budget in line with the FAR. Budget estimates for last year showed that E503 million were spent on 
royalty, which was 5 per cent of the E10 billion budget for 2010/2011.90  
Despite the country being in an economic crisis, in August 2011 the princes invited a group of 
females, who were on a private visit in the kingdom, to a drinking orgy of the most expensive 
whisky in one of the prestigious hotels.91 When the incensed guests complained of the waste of 
funds on the unnecessary imbibing in the light of the economic crisis, they were told not to be 
troubled. The guests, of South African origin, were assured that there were more funds from the 
princely source than the E2,4 billion loan to be given by South Africa.92 Their source of funds is the 
Royal and Emoluments Civil List budget which has been unaffected by the budget cuts. 
The King of Swaziland has been relentlessly criticised previously for the purchase of a private jet in 
2002 worth E400 million then, when 70 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line 
on less than US$1 a day.93 The life expectancy was 38 years and around 34 per cent of the 
population was dying of HIV/AIDS.94 When interviewed on the rationale of the purchase of the jet, 
the King simply said that cabinet had wanted to buy him a jet.95 The Minister of Finance, who then 
was and still is Majozi Sithole, talked of getting a refund but to date none has been forthcoming. 
The socio-economic situation in Swaziland has not improved since 2002. Today still, 70 per cent of 
the population of 1,2 billion lives below the poverty line and 79 per cent of the population lives in 
rural areas.96 Kleptocratic rulers are known to support interventions that provide personal benefits 
to them even though they do not increase the overall national income.97 This statement depicts the 
situation in Swaziland. There has been an outcry in Swaziland over the building of an airport, 
Sikhuphe International Airport, in the middle of nowhere, where neither an industrial city nor capital 
city is nearby. Worst of all, the country does not own a single airline. But because it is the King‟s 
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wish to have an international airport and reach first-world status by 2022, construction has to 
proceed despite the austere times. Hence E299 million were allocated for the completion of the 
airport in 2011.98 Even more urgent, as viewed by government, was the Mbadlane-Sikhuphe 
Highway which has been allocated E139 million.99 
While the cabinet was enthusiastic and optimistic about the completion of the airport by year end, 
crucial sectors of society have had to take a back seat. The health sector, which should be a 
priority of any government, is in dire need of rehabilitation because the infrastructure has become 
dilapidated and the resources are not sufficient.100 However, government has stated that the 
upgrading of the health sector will be done in phases due to financial constraints. The education 
sector has been affected as well. The commencement of studies in the 2011 academic year was 
delayed for over a month at the country‟s only university because government had no funds for 
tuition. 101 The scholarship policy had to be reviewed in 2011. Scholarships were awarded to only 
500 prospective university students with preference given to those opting for education, science 
and commercial studies.102 Moreover, the opening of primary schools in the country was delayed 
by three weeks because the government had not met its obligation of funding the Free Primary 
Education programme and the programme for orphaned and vulnerable children.103 
2.4 Conclusion 
There may be no consensus universally on the accepted definition of corruption. However, we are 
all agreed on what constitutes corruption. It may be difficult to describe corruption but Tanzi rightly 
asserts that it is not difficult to recognise it when observed due to its dire effects on the economy. 
Grand corruption has crippled many economies by stifling economic growth, lowering investment 
and increasing the levels of poverty. Corrupt leaders have compromised good governance all in 
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furtherance of their ulterior motives and interests in complete disregard for the people who put 
them in power.  
Swaziland has not been left unscathed by grand corruption. Its effects are seen vividly, touching all 
aspect of life. Such an abuse of discretionary power by those in authority can never be left 
unchecked or unfettered. It is for that reason that the international community has made concerted 
efforts to fight corruption. States, inclusive of Swaziland, are expected to join in the quest to 
prevent and combat corruption in their domestic settings. True, corruption may never be rooted out 
completely but its levels may be lowered. Thus, the next chapter discusses the methods employed 
by the Swazi government in the fight against corruption. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TACKLING CORRUPTION: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM IN 
SWAZILAND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between society and the leadership is one of trust. Accountability and 
transparency in a government system preserves the relationship. To ensure the promotion of 
accountability and transparency, states have developed national integrity systems. The system is 
used as an anti-corruption strategy. This chapter explores the anti-corruption strategy adopted by 
Swaziland. 
3.2 Historical background 
The fight against corruption in Swaziland is not a novel phenomenon. By the 1980s, the country 
had realised the adverse effects corruption has on the economy. The first attempt to mitigate its 
deleterious effects was the establishment of the office of the ombudsman in 1983.104 An 
ombudsman is an independent office tasked with the investigation of maladministration by public 
officials and abuse-of-power complaints by citizens against such officials.105 However, its existence 
(from 1984 – 1987) was cut short by the Coronation of King Mswati III in 1986, whose first decree 
abolished the office.106  
Even before the abolition of the office of the ombudsman, its success as an efficient body was 
doubted. It was criticised rigorously in academic circles for its poor constitution. Hatchard cites lack 
of independence as its major shortcoming and uses it as an example of „how not to organise and 
run an anti-corruption institution‟.107 The ombudsman was a person who also held a post as the 
secretary to the Liqoqo (Supreme Council of State).108 The Liqoqo was the authority entrusted with 
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„policy-making and policy-issuing‟.109 In essence, the ombudsman‟s office was controlled by the 
executive arm of the government. 
In 1993, another effort to combat corruption was made with the promulgation of the Prevention of 
Corruption Order. It provided for the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission which began 
its operation in 1998. The ACC was also a futile attempt in the fight against corruption as its 
success was hindered by a number of factors, including the limitations placed on its operations – it 
could not investigate cases or charge suspects.110 It also lacked independence, resources and the 
political will from the state to support it.111 
Also, there was controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the statute that created it. In 2002, the 
High Court declared the Prevention of Corruption Order of 1993 unconstitutional since it was not 
enacted by Parliament and, as such, was invalid.112 The Commission halted its operations as there 
was no longer any enabling statute legitimising it. For three years it did not function. It was only in 
2005 that the then Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the High Court and the Commission 
resumed its operations.113 However, the zeal to work was lost and little work was done until the 
enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006 which established the current Anti-Corruption 
Commission and terminated its predecessor.114  
3.3 Current anti-corruption legal framework 
3.3.1 International legislation 
Swaziland joined the international community in the fight against corruption by becoming signatory 
to three legal instruments. These are: 
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 United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2005;
115
  
 African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption of 2003;
116
 
 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption of 2005.
117
 
The instruments portray one spirit in the fight against corruption, hence their essence will be 
summarised in relation to public officials and grand corruption. They provide for the development of 
policies that promote good governance and mandate states to establish well-resourced 
independent anti-corruption bodies.118 
In relation to the conduct of public officials, states are encouraged to set integrity standards that 
will bind officials to promote integrity, honesty and accountability.119 Hence, when officials violate 
any of the standards, a state is encouraged to have whistle blowing mechanisms and further 
protect those whistle blowers.120 
To ensure transparent public funds management, states are encouraged to establish procurement 
procedures which reflect accountability and transparency according to fair rules and further ensure 
low risk management and timeous government accounting.121 
To strengthen the above efforts, what is needed is an independent judiciary which ought to act as a 
check upon the government and ensure compliance with the measures it has adopted in 
preventing and combating corruption.122 States should also facilitate mechanisms that recognise 
the media and civil society as stakeholders in the fight against corruption.123 Importantly, UNCAC 
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makes the recovery of assets stolen through corruption a fundamental principle by mandating 
states parties to adopt measures that will facilitate and ensure asset recovery domestically or 
internationally through mutual legal assistance.124 
3.3.2 Domestic legislation  
The current anti-corruption framework of Swaziland began in 2005, which also marked a new dawn 
in the politics of Swaziland. The country welcomed its first autochthonous constitution which is the 
supreme law of the country and embraces the spirit of democracy. In response to the scourge of 
corruption, it was determined to soldier on in the fight against it by providing for anti-corruption 
policies. Thereafter, a new body of laws against corruption was promulgated and is continuously 
being developed. 
The legal framework regulating public officials in the fight against corruption includes the following 
statutes: 
 The Constitution of Swaziland Act of 2005; 
 The Prevention of Corruption Act of 2006 (POCA); 
 Other ancillary statutes.125  
3.3.2.1 The Constitution of Swaziland 
The state has made it its policy to „expose, combat and eradicate corruption‟.126 In this regard, it 
has provided for the establishment of anti-corruption agencies involving all arms of government to 
assist in the prevention and combating of corruption. Through the legislature, it has provided for 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)127 and ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry that may be 
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assembled to investigate maladministration by the executive.128 The office of the Auditor-General, 
linked to the executive yet independent, is to audit all government accounts.129  
To regulate the conduct of public officials, chapter XVI of the Constitution provides for the 
Leadership Code of Conduct and the establishment of the Integrity Commission to enforce it. It 
also obliges public officials to declare any conflict of interest in the carrying out of their duties and 
avoid any conduct that exposes them to corruption. 
Moreover, chapter VIII of the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary that will carry out 
its functions without fear or favour and subject only to the Constitution. The judiciary includes all 
the courts of the land, the office of the Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP). 
3.3.2.2 The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) 
The Act establishes the ACC as an independent body and provide for its functions, powers and the 
appointment of commissioners.130 Part III criminalises offences related to corruption but short-
sightedly concentrates on public sector corruption. It implies that a crime related to corruption will 
occur where a person gives an undue influence to a public official or where a public official solicits 
same. The focus of politicians on grand corruption is too narrow; hence, it limits the scope of public 
officials that could be accountable for the crime.131 
It only provides for the protection of informers during a trial and such protection is only in relation to 
their identity.132 Asset recovery is implemented only once a conviction has been secured and such 
powers are limited to the DPP.133 The ACC only has the power to seize property for investigation 
purposes.134  
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3.4 The anti-corruption strategy 
There is no single strategy that is considered to be the best in tackling corruption. A multilateral 
approach that encompasses different mechanisms is always proposed as the best one. Langseth 
et al argue that while anti-corruption strategies differ across the world, they should encompass one 
or more of the following: 
a) Public sector corruption agencies; 
b) „Watchdog‟ agencies; 
c) Public awareness on the role of civil society; 
d) Accountability of the judicial process; 
e) The media; 
f) Private sector and international business; 
g) International cooperation. 135 
A strategy may not uproot corruption totally.136 But Pope states that its ultimate goal must be to 
make corruption a „high risk and low return undertaking‟.137 It has to decrease the chances of 
engaging in corruption, especially amongst public officials, and increase transparency and 
accountability. Thus, its emphasis is on the prevention of corruption rather than relying on the 
penalties afterwards.138 The pillars of the strategy should be interdependent but will be of varying 
strengths. Langseth et al caution that if any of these pillars weakens, it overburdens the others, 
thereby increasing corruption and undermining sustainable development.139 Ultimately the whole 
system collapses. 
Swaziland uses a multi-pronged approach in the fight against corruption. The mechanisms 
employed in this regard include the ACC, Auditor-General, Commissions of inquiry and the 
judiciary. 
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3.4.1 The Anti-Corruption Commission 
At the heart of the anti-corruption strategy is the ACC, an independent body created by POCA. The 
ACC mainly functions on the „multi-purpose with law enforcement powers‟140 model. Meagher 
terms it the single-agency strategy as it encompasses all the key responsibilities and resources 
under one entity, as does Hong Kong‟s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).141 
According to Khemani such a model embarks on preventative, investigative and education 
mandates, focusing on, amongst other things, investigation of violations of laws, training the public 
and private sectors and raising awareness of corruption through campaigns and societal 
educational programmes.142 
To fulfil its investigative mandate, the ACC investigates cases reported to it then remits them to the 
DPP for prosecution.143 Since inception in 2007, 249 cases have been reported to the ACC and 
178 of those cases have been authorised for investigation.144 By August 2011, 115 cases were still 
under investigation while 18 cases have been forwarded to the DPP's offices and 9 currently are 
pending in court.145 One case resulting in a conviction was concluded.146 
The Commission also works with other enforcement agencies. It has a memorandum of 
understanding with the Central Bank‟s Anti-Money Laundering Supervisory Authority. These 
agencies cooperate with each other and share information relating to fiscal crimes. The 
supervisory authority transmits suspicious money laundering reports relating to corruption as the 
predicate offences to the ACC for further investigations. 
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The ACC is empowered to arrest people who do not cooperate with it during investigations. In 
2009, the ACC issued a warrant for the arrest of the former Managing Director of the Swaziland 
Post and Telecommunications Corporation, Nathi Dlamini, for obstructing its investigations by not 
releasing documents which were in his possession and pertinent to the investigations. He 
challenged the arrest through the hierarchy of courts until the Supreme Court, which confirmed the 
decisions of the courts a quo of the power of arrest of the ACC and dismissed the application.147 
In the year 2009/2010, nine interactive presentations were made to public bodies while eight were 
made to private bodies in line with the ACC‟s education function. As a preventative mechanism, it 
also conducts educational awareness programmes around the country, sensitising civil society to 
the problem and encouraging it to join in the quest against corruption and report any corrupt 
practices. In this regard, nine communities were visited, 25 media programmes were hosted across 
all media channels and two schools were visited.148 
The noticeable challenges that hinder the progress of the ACC are similar to those experienced by 
the previous commission, which partially accounted for its failure. The ACC mainly lacks resources 
and funding. In the year 2009/2010, the ACC reported that it had difficulty carrying out its mandate 
because of poor information technology infrastructure which is needed for research and its day-to-
day functions.149 The available local area network is connected to the government server, which 
compromises the security and confidentiality of its functions.150 It also lacked the funds to upgrade 
its in-house capacity-building programmes.151 Moreover, despite the ACC not having adequate 
office space to accommodate the current personnel, it is still understaffed, thus compromising on 
productivity.152 
The complexity of corruption cases lengthens the investigative process. The success of a case lies 
in the assets recovered from the criminal more than in the imprisonment of one. To punish 
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economic criminals effectively, one has to hit them where it hurts the most, which is depriving them 
off the proceeds of their crimes. This will depend on the assert recovery programme of an ACC. 
Immediate seizure of the assets guarantees that there will be evidence of the crime and assets to 
be confiscated for repatriation. However, the Swazi ACC is empowered to seize assets only for the 
purposes of investigations, subject to satisfying the Court that there exists a prima facie case 
against the suspect.153 Only the DPP is empowered to confiscate the assets once a conviction has 
been secured.154 By the time a conviction is secured, invariably, the criminal would have disposed 
of the assets and the state would recover nothing. 
3.4.2 The Integrity Commission 
This agency, established by the Constitution, is housed under the Commission on Human Rights 
and Public Administration for the purposes of receiving written declarations of assets and liabilities 
of public officials and enforcing the Leadership Code of Conduct.155 The Constitution provides for 
the promulgation of the Leadership Code of Conduct to ensure that those in leadership do not 
abuse office or engage in corrupt practices.156 Hence, within six months of assuming office, senior 
public officials are expected to declare any assets and liabilities they have to the Integrity 
Commission, and further declare them every two years whilst in office and at the end of their 
term.157 Moreover, it is expected of them to declare any conflict of interest in the execution of their 
functions so as to avoid corruption.158    
However, the Integrity Commission has not had any productive operations since the enabling 
legislation required for it to operate has not been promulgated. Both the Human Rights Bill and the 
Leadership Code of Conduct are pending in Parliament for debate. Nonetheless, the Integrity 
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Commission has received some declarations from the politicians, although these have not been 
made public and „it is not clear whether there is a requirement that they be made public‟.159 
3.4.3 The Office of the Auditor-General  
The office of the Auditor-General (A-G) is fundamental in the accountability of the financial 
management of government. It is normally an independent body that acts as an external auditor of 
government accounts. It ensures that the executive arm of government is accountable for the funds 
appropriated by the legislature.160 McGee states that the role of the A-G is to ensure that 
government expenditures are accounted for adequately by an extensive independent audit.161 
Therefore, the A-G promotes transparency and accountability, which are integral tenets of good 
governance, resulting in the prevention and combating of corruption. The Constitution provides for 
the establishment of the A-G as an independent body auditing all public accounts of Swaziland.162 
Hence, the independence of the office lies at the heart of its operations. In his 2010 report, the A-G 
buttressed this point by stating that his responsibility is to express an independent audit of 
government accounts in line with international standards.163 However, the office of the A-G is not 
an independent entity in Swaziland. 
The operations of the A-G are guided by the Financial Management and Audit Act, 1967 (as 
amended) which stipulates guidelines on the reporting and accounting procedures of government‟s 
revenue and expenditure accounts.164 In the execution of his functions, the A-G is to inspect the 
public accounts and satisfy himself that the management measures taken „ensure that resources 
are procured economically and are utilized efficiently and effectively‟.165 He examines the accounts 
and where he encounters inconsistencies, he requests the internal controlling officers of the 
government departments under review to give further explanations.166 In the year ending in March 
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2010, only 59 per cent of the requests remitted to internal controlling officers were brought back 
with responses.167 In comparison with the previous years, it was an improvement as in 2008 the 
response rate was only 37 per cent while in 2009, a 54 per cent response rate was recorded.168  
The conduct of the controlling officers has not been overlooked, for Parliament has resorted to 
imposing fines upon them to deter them from future misconduct. While the statistics show an 
improvement, the deterrent effect of the fines imposed is questionable. In one case, a controlling 
officer of the Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development was fined a meagre E400 for 
losing E5 million, which fine is determined by statute.169 Of note is that many of the statutes in 
Swaziland are archaic, hence the fines imposed will be out-dated. Thus, in weighing pleasure 
against pain, the controlling officer might choose not to give explanations and face the charge. 
If the A-G is not satisfied with the explanations rendered and suspects that there are elements of 
fraud and corruption, he refers the matter to the Minister of Finance who, further, reports the matter 
to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). In the case involving Minister Nelisiwe Shongwe, the 
Auditor-General referred the matter to the PAC which found that the Minister had colluded with the 
regional accountant and defrauded government.170 The matter was referred to the ACC and the 
PAC recommended further that the controlling officer in the department that suffered the loss 
should surcharge the regional accountant the sum of E63 520 to be paid with 90 days.171 
To reinforce the competence of the internal controlling officers and auditors, the government has 
enlisted the services of an external audit company, KPMG. This company is expected to advise 
and work closely with the internal audit unit.172 While this is a good initiative, its success is 
undermined by the fact there is no skill-sharing between the two. In such initiatives, it is expected 
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that there will be capacity building, with the local staff gaining knowledge from the foreign experts. 
However, the government auditors felt that they were not part of the process but spectators, and 
complained that the KPMG experts were using them as messengers rather than colleagues; 
hence, they were not learning anything from them.173   
The A-G is expected to table a report within six months of the close of every financial year (ending 
in March).174 However, akin to the other agencies, the office has been plagued by challenges that 
hinder its effective functioning. The A-G noted in his 2010 report that his office faced budgetary 
constraints and recruitment deficiencies.175 The Minister of Finance was aware of the problem as 
he reported in the FAR that „the extent of the A-G‟s work is limited by inadequate capacity – 
number of staff, professional qualification and budget allocations‟.176  
So dire was the situation that it affected the training of staff. The employees are to be trained 
regularly for effective performance. The A-G‟s office, however, could not afford the trainings and 
the staff embarked on private training funded from personal funds. The A-G also noted that there 
was a continuous decrease in the budget of the office, yet it was expected to audit large budgets 
and activities of various government ministries and departments. Consequently, the office under-
performed and the levels of corruption increased. Both the A-G and the Finance Minister noted that 
these challenges could be rectified by the amendment of the Audit Act to ensure that the office had 
greater independence in its functions. The PAC has called also for the amendment of the Audit Act 
to give the office of the A-G autonomy over its functions.177 
3.4.4 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
The PAC is a parliamentary committee tasked with considering the report of the Auditor-General. 
Wehner describes it as the wing of the legislature that will scrutinise the report as the House of 
Assembly does not delve into the details of the report.178 The PAC helps Parliament hold the 
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executive accountable for public funds by calling the members of the executive to answer before it 
on allegations of corruption and fraud based on the report, and on comments and 
recommendations by the A-G. 
In Swaziland, section 209 of the Constitution establishes the PAC and it provides for the regulation 
of the PAC through Standing Orders of Parliament. It is constituted of 12 members elected from 
the House of Assembly.179 The mandate of the PAC includes „investigating and reviewing past, 
current and committed expenditures of government and organisations receiving funds from 
government corporations‟.180 In executing this mandate, it may call, mero motu, upon the A-G to 
review some government departments, gain access to all financial information necessary for its 
investigations (except privileged information) and call witnesses.181 Moreover, the PAC may call 
upon the Principal Secretaries of ministries under review or the Ministers themselves to clarify 
issues in the report of the A-G.182  
The role of the PAC is mainly dependent on the report of the A-G, in that the PAC acts as a 
parliamentary follow-up to the report of the A-G whilst it also uses the report as a source for its 
enquiries.183 Hence, its effectiveness depends on the timeous reporting of the A-G, who is 
expected to make such reports within six months after the year ends. However, McGee warns 
against the PAC being a „mere mirror of the A-G‟ by waiting upon the A-G‟s report to facilitate its 
work.184 He suggests that it ought to initiate investigations of its own accord where it suspects 
corruption, instead of waiting for the report of the A-G.185 Such early intervention will ensure that 
corruption is nipped in the bud. Thus, in the land scam involving the Prime Minister, the PAC 
intervened early and investigated the malfeasance in November 2010 before the year ended in 
March 2011 and hence, before the A-G tabled his report.186  
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While the PAC may investigate cases of maladministration by the government, it must be noted 
that it has no power to pronounce upon the criminal culpability of the offenders where it suspects 
fraud and corruption.187 It merely identifies the wrongdoing and transmits the matter to the ACC for 
further investigations. However, it may impose fines on the wrongdoers where it feels that their 
conduct was below the standards expected of them.188 
3.4.5 Commissions of inquiry 
Working together with the PAC in Parliament are the ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry tasked with 
investigating allegations of government maladministration. Section 129 of the Constitution provides 
for establishment of sessional committees by Parliament to investigate and inquire into the 
administrative activities of government.  
A significant Commission of Inquiry was the Land Select Committee which was convened in 2010 
for investigating the alleged purchase of 25 hectares of land, situated at Ezulwini and worth E31 
million, by the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Lindiwe Dlamini, who apportioned part 
of the money to herself.189 The Minister was found to have abused her power and flouted 
procedure and, thus, was ordered to reverse the transaction.190 Parliament initially suggested that 
a vote of no confidence be moved against her but later sentenced her to 60 hours of community 
service.191  
The sentence raises questions as to the legality of its status. A parliamentary committee ordinarily 
does not determine the criminal culpability of a person but in this case it did and the matter was 
considered to have been resolved. It would be expected that a court should determine her criminal 
liability. But, in this instance, adjudicating on the matter would amount to double jeopardy for the 
sentence meted out by the Committee is considered to have by-passed the issue of the Minister‟s 
criminal liability. No other legal action has been moved against the Minister, despite her action 
being a clear case of corruption. It would seem, therefore, either that the allegations by the 
                                                            
187
 McGee (2002: 76). 
188
 McGee (2002: 76). 
189
 Lushaba (22 January 2011). 
190
 Nkambule (16 January 2011). 
191
 Nkambule (16 January 2011). 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Commissioner of the ACC that it is difficult to pursue cases against top officials due to their relation 
to the King is plausible,192 or that the legislature is protecting its members from being held 
accountable. Either of these possibilities illustrates the culture of impunity in cases involving top 
officials.  
3.4.6 Procurement system 
The current procurement system of Swaziland is still young. An effective procurement system is 
one which is transparent, fair, impartial, economical and efficient, all things which the erstwhile 
procurement system was not. Only in 2011 was the Procurement Act enacted to remedy the 
weaknesses of the system after severe criticisms and recommendations by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB). The AfDB had observed that the procurement system was not 
transparent and was regulated by out-dated laws.193 Owing to the deficiencies in the system, it was 
not economical since the suppliers of government overcharged it. In some instances, prices were 
increased by 100 per cent194 and impartiality was not guaranteed as the companies awarded 
tenders were owned by politicians.195 Hence, funds that would have been allocated for sustainable 
development were lost through an inefficient system and corruption. 
The Minister of Finance was confident that with the enactment of the Procurement Act government 
would minimise corruption. The Act establishes the Public Procurement Regulatory Agency which 
is an independent body with duties to oversee and manage public procurement in liaison with 
internal government procurement departments.196  A Procurement Manual was introduced in 2010. 
The effectiveness of the system devised is yet to be seen. A significant improvement is the 
disqualification, by Section 60(2) of the Act, of politicians as candidates eligible to tender for 
government contracts.  
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3.4.7 The Judiciary 
The effectiveness of the judiciary depends on its independence, impartiality and non-interference 
from the other arms of government. Judicial independence speaks to security of tenure and 
assurance that judicial officers will not be removed arbitrarily from office by the other arms of 
government.197 Thus, their term of office may be limited only by age198 and removal from office 
before end of term is justified only in cases of gross misconduct.199 While the Constitution 
guarantees independence of the judiciary in Swaziland, the practicability of this principle is 
questionable, and history suggests that it is elusive.  
In 2002, the government was determined not to follow any court rulings against the executive.200 
The government adopted extreme measures of raiding the premises of the then DPP and 
confiscated his files because he had refused to withdraw charges of contempt of court against the 
Attorney-General.201 The Attorney-General, together with the police, had instructed the High Court 
judges to stop hearing a civil case against the King.202 The ensuing crisis resulted in the demotion 
of a High Court judge, the resignation of the four Court of Appeal judges and the DPP, and a strike 
by members of the legal profession.203 With the advent of the Constitution, it was expected that 
such violation of the rule of law would be a thing of the past. The government spokesperson, Percy 
Simelane, optimistically declared that the Constitution brought an end to the rule-of-law crisis.204  
However, recent events defy the ambitions of the spokesperson. Impartiality of the judiciary entails 
that judicial officers apply the law and take decisions without fear, favour or prejudice.205 Their 
administrative functions should not be influenced by the other arms of government and they should 
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be insulated from civil actions for improper conduct undertaken during judicial activities.206 In 2011, 
a High Court judge, Justice Masuku, was removed from office arbitrarily for saying in a judgment 
that the King had a „forked tongue‟.207 A sham case was brought against him as the Chief Justice 
was complainant and judge in the matter.208 When the recusal of the Chief Justice was sought, he 
claimed that the hearing was an investigative process on the allegations and further refused to 
have it conducted in public.209 The judge was found guilty and was dismissed. The Minister of 
Justice, who refused to endorse the dismissal of the judge, was also dismissed after a cabinet 
reshuffle.210 In response to the judicial crisis, members of the law profession embarked on a 
strike.211  
The Attorney-General, as a legal advisor to the Cabinet and Parliament and also custodian of 
public interests through the institution of cases, should strike a balance in the execution of his 
functions.212 When the Prime Minister hosted a party for the Attorney-General for ensuring that 
appeals cases were decided in favour of the government, it raised a suspicion as to the 
independence of the judiciary with regard to influence from the executive.213 It cast a doubt on the 
interests the Attorney General was furthering. Were they for the public or the executive? His 
functions may be influenced by the other arms of government but he should not fear to pursue 
cases against politicians or the head of state. The prevention of corruption is also dependent on 
the advice he will give to Parliament that will inform the formulation of policy and legislation. 
3.4.8 The Swaziland National Anti-Corruption Strategy (SNACS) 
In 2007, the country developed an anti-corruption strategy which consisted of a multi-sector 
participatory approach involving government, civil society, the media and the private sector in the 
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fight against corruption. The strategy had three broad objectives, namely, „ethics awareness and 
prevention, combating corruption, and oversight transparency and accountability‟, which objectives 
were based on a set of principles including the rule of law, good governance and efficiency.214 
The strategy was a positive initiative in the fight against corruption. It would have assisted in easing 
the burden of the ACC, thus strengthening the anti-corruption system. However, it was not 
implemented. Four years later, no mention of it has been made by all concerned parties. It has not 
been mentioned even in the annual SMART partnership dialogues that the country has hosted 
since 2003 in a bid to find a solution to the economic crisis and development of the country.215 
3.4.9 The media 
The role of the media in the fight against corruption cannot be overestimated. The media have 
played a major role in sensitising society to corruption and exposing it by acting as a whistle 
blower. In a corruption perception research exercise in the country, the media were voted number 
one in the top ten tools to fight corruption by 25 per cent of the respondents.216  
Generally, government should not interfere in the role of the media as an appraisal mechanism of 
the legislature and executive.217 However, where the government owns a majority of the media, as 
is the case in Swaziland, the independence and freedom of the press will not guaranteed. 
Government will censor the media to avoid criticism.   
While the Constitution guarantees freedom of the press,218 the media are censored from reporting 
on news criticising government. The 2010 US Country Report on Human Rights in Swaziland 
reported that in 2008, „the Attorney General warned journalists against criticising government as 
they would be viewed as terrorists and arrested under Section 2(b) of the Suppression of Terrorism 
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Act, 2008‟.219 Such threats have not affected the print media for they have reported steadfastly on 
corruption. Rose-Ackerman argues that reporting on corruption scandals is a sign of political 
maturity; the citizens recognise the difference between public and private spheres and are willing 
to complain when the boarder is crossed.220 Thus the media should be engaged in the fight against 
corruption as a check on the government. 
Rose-Ackerman argues, further, that instead of censorship, libel laws will be used to insulate 
politicians or heads of state from public criticism by the media.221 The case of Bheki Makhubu 
confirmed that media are banned from reporting negatively on the monarchy.222 Hence, the media 
cannot act as a critic of the wasteful monarchy.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The failure of Swaziland in combating the escalating rate of corruption cannot be attributed to the 
lack of an anti-corruption system. The anti-corruption system of Swaziland is comprehensive and 
covers a wide variety of the bodies necessary to reinforce the fight against corruption. However, 
the weaknesses and challenges faced by these agencies undermine the efforts made by the state. 
Worth noting is that these weaknesses are recurrent since they are observed from the first anti-
corruption attempts. Despite the ombudsman of Swaziland being used as an example of „how not 
to run an anti-corruption body‟ by scholars, Swaziland does not learnt from its history. Strong as 
the anti-corruption bodies look on paper, they are undermined primarily by the lack of 
independence and resources. Consequently, it weakens the anti-corruption system. 
The succeeding chapter is a critical analysis of the strategy adopted by the state with a view to 
understanding the persistently high rate of corruption in Swaziland. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION: AN 
ANALYSIS 
 
‘Failure to combat corruption is more to do with institution failings than institution absence.’
223
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Corruption in Swaziland has reached abysmal levels. Monthly losses of E80 million are destructive 
to the economy and to sustainable development. The system adopted in curbing corruption has to 
be one that increases the accountability of the senior officials in the exercise of the discretionary 
powers bestowed upon them. As already noted, the system is a comprehensive one, albeit 
inadequate as the levels of corruption have been on the rise. The government has attested to this 
inadequacy by conceding that its efforts in combating corruption are not effective.224 
The crux of the anti-corruption system is the ACC. The other agencies in the system identify 
corruption and report it to the ACC for investigations. Therefore, as the success of the anti-
corruption system rests on the ACC, it will be the subject of the critical analysis that follows. While 
the international instruments against corruption advocate the establishment of anti-corruption 
bodies, they never provide implementation details.225 It is left to each state to tailor the bodies to 
best fit its domestic setting.226 Swaziland has adopted the international agenda and created an 
ACC in line with international objectives. However, the system has proven to be inadequate as the 
levels of corruption are on the rise. 
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4.2 Measuring the adequacy of the ACC 
The system adopted should be a strong one that is interwoven amongst the different pillars to act 
as a check on the monopoly powers of the senior officials.227 The success of the interdependence 
will depend on the strength of the individual pillars that make up the system. Langseth et al argue 
that any weak link will overwhelm the system and tilt it towards corruption and abuse.228 By 
analogy, the success of an ACC will be determined by the inter-relations it maintains with the other 
bodies. An ACC is usually measured against „seven deadly sins‟ from which most suffer, namely: 
 Political  
 Economic  
 Governance  
 Legal 
 Organisational  
 Performance 
 Public confidence. 229  
Scholars have analysed the different reasons for the failures of most African ACCs and 
unanimously conclude that they suffer from the above sins which evidently hamper their success. 
The ACC of Swaziland will be measured also against these sins to establish the reasons for its 
failures in preventing and curbing corruption. 
4.2.1 Political sins 
Political sins are lack of „genuine political commitment‟ from the leadership.230 U4 argues that it is 
difficult to measure political sins due to their diversity of form.231 However, academics agree that 
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they are primarily identified as lack of honest intention in the creation of the ACC.232 The ACC will 
be hastily established due to pressure from international donors.233  
Mbaku argues that an ACC which is established to appease international donors will be designed 
not to affect high ranking officials, despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in 
corruption.234 A deficiency of the approach taken by POCA, which has affected the Swazi ACC, is 
that it has limited the scope of „politicians‟ with regard to the offences relating to politicians.235 The 
list of politicians exclude the executive (Ministers) or the Prime Minister.236 Analogically, express 
mention of one, excludes the other. Hence, the question that arises is which agency has the 
authority to initiate investigations into malfeasance by the executive. 
The tendency is that the PAC or a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry will initiate investigations 
into corruption by the executive and where it decides that a matter is final, the ACC will not pursue 
it. As already noted, such conduct contradicts the mandate of the PAC which cannot pronounce on 
the criminal liability of a person. In effect, it inhibits the ACC from pursuing the matter further and 
perpetuates the culture of impunity. Illustrations include the E31 million land sale and the land 
scam cases. In the former case, the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry had sentenced the 
Minister involved to community service for abuse of power, thereby trivialising the severity of the 
case.237 The matter was closed and no further investigations were conducted. In the land scam 
case, the King would not have issued a directive to stop any proceedings had the ACC taken the 
initiative instead of leaving it to the PAC to refer it.238 
The argument is further buttressed by the non-ratification of the international instruments to which 
Swaziland is signatory. The ACC has been campaigning and lobbying the state to ratify these 
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instruments to enhance the provisions of POCA, but in vain.239 No positive response or 
commitment is forthcoming from the state. Hence, the will from the state is not genuine but it is 
aimed at appeasing international donors so that they may release funds which will seep through 
the cracks of the system and not reach their intended recipients. 
Lack of political will is regarded as the most deadly of all the sins since it influences the functioning 
of the system. Camerer argues that ACCs need high levels of political support and democratic 
conditions under which they can operate.240 The determination to tackle corruption may be present 
but meaningless if an ACC is not supported by a favourable political climate, good governance and 
a functioning and credible rule of law and legal system.241 Where political will is deficient or absent, 
it unlikely that the ACC will succeed and produce the results expected by the citizens. The 
legitimacy of the system will be undermined. Thus, lack of political commitment guarantees the 
failure of the ACC.  
4.2.2 Economic sins 
Economic sins are influenced by a number of factors in the micro- and macro-economic 
environment.242 Klemenčič & Stusek argue that an ACC is „likely to fail if it is operating in an 
environment of endemic corruption and a highly state-controlled economy‟.243 Contributing to the 
economic sins will be insufficient funding. Indeed, as already noted, the ACC in Swaziland is 
challenged by stark financial resource constraints. It complained that its budget could not sustain 
its operations; hence, it could not deliver services satisfactorily.244 The prevalence of grand 
corruption in Swaziland cannot be overemphasised. The budgetary constraints coupled with the 
high levels of corruption overwhelm the ACC. 
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4.2.3 Governance sins 
The stability of an ACC will be dependent on the overall performance of the different pillars in the 
anti-corruption system and the governance structure of government in general.245 Governance sins 
are a lack of effective institutional co-ordination amongst an ACC, the other pillars in the anti-
corruption system and other government departments.246 The different pillars normally want to 
guard their territory and handle a case without the interference of the other pillars. In Swaziland, 
coordinated efforts are only present between the ACC, police and Anti-Money Laundering 
Supervisory Authority.247 There was no coordination involving the erstwhile procurement 
department, which was a completely corrupt institution. The process linking the financial pillars 
(Auditor-General and procurement department) with the enforcement authorities (ACC, police and 
DPP) is unnecessarily bureaucratic and smothers accountability, as some cases are dealt with 
administratively by the PAC which has limited powers in relation to criminal culpability. A Mutual 
Evaluation Report on Swaziland (2011) by ESAAMLG also noted that there was a „lack of defined 
coordinated process amongst the institutions of government‟.248  
Udombana succinctly captures the relationship between good governance and corruption in the 
proposition that „good governance curbs corruption and the disappearance of corruption enhances 
good governance‟.249 He further argues that good governance is a „basket of many practices‟ 
including accountability, transparency and participatory governance which sustain economic 
development.250 Where some of the pillars in the system shield the senior politicians from 
accountability for their actions it affects the good governance of the country. Some cases have 
been filtered through the criminal justice such as the case of the E31 million land sale.251 A blatant 
case of grand corruption was summarily dealt with by parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, further 
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encouraging the culture of impunity.252 Consequently, it affects the effectiveness of the ACC. 
Klemenčič & Stusek argue that the ACC becomes an „island of integrity surrounded by a sea of 
corruption‟ which increases the burden it is carrying.253 The governance sin has continually 
obstructed the effective fight against corruption.  
4.2.4 Legal sins 
Legal sins are attributed to a weak legal framework and a weak state of rule of law under which an 
ACC operates.254 U4 argues that where there is no rule of law or it has broken down and decisions 
are taken arbitrarily, the failure of an ACC is inevitable.255 Respect for the rule of law has always 
been minimal in Swaziland. The rule of law crises of 2002-2004 and 2011 are clear indications of 
the executive and head of state arbitrarily interfering in the work of the judiciary.256 The judicial 
crises have halted the functioning of the courts, occasioning a backlog of cases. 257 The land scam, 
further, illustrates not only a breakdown in the rule of law but also the culture of impunity prevailing 
in grand corruption cases.  
Where a weak legal foundation defines the functions, powers and responsibilities of an ACC, it will 
affect its effectiveness.258 The allocation of the prosecutorial mandate to the DPP instead of the 
ACC has created cooperation problems. Cases have been postponed for want of evidence. The 
cause of the delay is that the prosecution is not involved in the investigative process of the ACC to 
guide it on the material information necessary for establishing viable cases. Moreover, where the 
prosecution is based in the ACC it ensures capacity development and expertise in the field. In 
corruption cases of Swaziland, advocates from South Africa have had to be hired on an ad hoc 
basis to assist in the prosecution and adjudging of the cases.259 In this regard, the state loses 
funds which could have been invested in capacity building and training of local experts. 
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POCA itself is drafted poorly. It is common knowledge that monies stolen through corruption are 
kept in offshore bank accounts which are out of reach of the local authorities. To reclaim them, an 
asset recovery system that is supported by mutual legal assistance is necessary. POCA does not 
establish any mechanism for asset recovery in extrajudicial matters. Apart from that fact, locally the 
ACC can seize assets only for purposes of investigations260 and the DPP is the only office 
authorised to confiscate assets in Swaziland, through the Serious Offence (Confiscation of 
Proceeds) Act of 2001, once a conviction has been secured.261 Thus, the system allows for 
criminal forfeiture only, and not civil forfeiture.262 Civil proceedings (against the thing itself) are an 
option in cases such as grand corruption for the person might be immune from litigation or a 
fugitive. While the ACC has called for the amendment of POCA, the gap in the law could be filled 
by UNCAC, as it provides for asset recovery via in rem proceedings, but it has not been ratified. As 
yet, the ACC has no legal basis for in rem proceedings. 
4.2.5 Organisational sins 
The international instruments on anti-corruption leave it to states to choose the type of ACC that 
will best suit their domestic settings. In establishing ACCs, countries tend to follow the examples of 
success, such as the Hong Kong model,263 which model Swaziland has assumed. However, 
Klemenčič & Stusek argue that no model may be applicable equally in different situations and its 
successes depend on the environment in which it is established.264 It is for that reason that a 
country should asses the context in which an ACC is established. The Hong Kong model was 
suitable in that environment because, as Camerer describes it, it was a „small city state with 
distinctive culture and highly efficient administrative machine operating in a highly sustainable 
economic growth society‟.265  
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U4 argues that the African environment is quite different, economically, socially and politically, and 
transposing of the Hong Kong model may not suffice.266 Indeed, the political landscape of 
Swaziland is very different to that of Hong Kong, as it is an absolute monarchy based on a dual 
governance system – the tinkhundla and modern systems of governance. While the ethnic 
composition of the country ensures that there are no language barriers in the fight against 
corruption, the close-knit family ties have proven to be an obstacle. Since corruption is perpetrated 
in the guise of cultural practices, some do not see the significance of fighting corruption while 
others are ambivalent of the existence of the ACC.267 In response to the ignorance, the ACC has 
been conducting public awareness programmes on corruption and its own programmes.  
However, the ACC focused primarily on bureaucratic corruption, neglecting graft. Hence, in dealing 
with graft cases it has focused on its investigative rather than the preventative function. Yet again, 
Klemenčič & Stusek accuse ACCs of focusing on one function, the investigative one, to the 
detriment of the preventative one and classify the approach as an organisational sin.268 The key 
cause of graft in Swaziland is lack of accountability. In preventing grand corruption, the ACC has to 
direct its educational awareness and training programmes in reinforcing the accountability 
structures in government as a long-term solution to preventing it. Concentrating on criminal 
investigations is treating the symptom only, not the cause. Pope argues that the strength of the 
Hong Kong Commission was in the coordination of the prevention and investigation roles which 
enabled it to develop a coherent and coordinated strategy in tackling corruption.269 Hence, he 
argues, further, that commissions that have copied the Hong Kong model have failed largely due to 
the lack of a coherent approach.270 
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Corruption in Swaziland is systemic. Systemic or entrenched corruption pervades the political and 
economic institutions, routinely becoming part of them, so that few honest people can be identified. 
It is encouraged by an inefficient or lax anti-corruption system.271 Nicholls et al argue that:272  
It thrives where institutions are weak or non-existent and it is closely related to 
poor governance; where there are inadequate legislative controls, no independent 
judiciary …; and where independent media agencies are absent. …what you 
really have is a kleptocracy, a Government that has institutionalised theft at its 
heart. 
 
 Ogonda, a UNDP public policy specialist, has noted that the current structure of the ACC was not 
equipped to curb corruption efficiently, particularly graft.273 He contends that, at present, the ACC 
would have to duplicate itself to monitor government accountability structures which would 
necessitate that about 10 000 officers are deployed amongst the 18 government ministries.274 
According to him, the ACC would also have to be systemic to prevent grand corruption 
effectively.275 In this regard, he proposes that the ACC should adopt a „sectoral approach to 
accountability‟.276 In this approach, the ACC will delegate its preventative function to Principal 
Secretaries as the accounting officers of a ministry.277 Thus, the Principal Secretaries would 
scrutinise the legislation, identify the gaps in their accountability mechanisms and address them 
accordingly.278 This structure will enable the ACC to target fighting corruption at ministerial level, 
unlike the broader approach it uses currently. Hence, an organisational structure which is 
inappropriate for the domestic setting may weaken the organisation and result in an organisational 
sin.279 
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4.2.6 Performance sins 
Performance sins are partially self-inflicted by ACCs who set higher standards than they can 
achieve. Khemani accuses them of setting „unrealistic benchmarks that are unattainable creating 
an unreasonably high expectation in the public‟.280 When they do not deliver as expected, the 
public loses confidence in them and they lose legitimacy. The Swazi ACC has developed a 
strategy that sets out its action plan. It proposes to root out all types of corruption by adopting a 
zero tolerance approach to combating it.281 In this regard, it rightly has identified the civil service to 
be vulnerable to corruption and, inter alia, will promote ethical and integrity practices amongst the 
civil service.282 Hence, it places great importance on an honest and clean civil service.  
However, this approach is single-minded. The media, which play a role in exposing corruption, 
have been exposing graft cases endlessly. The focus of the public has been shifted to preventing 
and curbing corruption at the top. Academics argue that where the top is corrupt, it will be difficult 
to have a clean civil service. While the efforts of the ACC are well intentioned, the aims it has set, 
coupled with its approach, are not in line with the reasonable expectations of the public which 
wants to see an end to grand corruption. Thus, as the ACC Commissioner has noted, the public 
sees the strategy as ambitious instead of realistic.283 
Contributing to performance sins is „lack of staff with the relevant skills and expertise‟.284 In the 
year 2009/2010, apart from inadequate human resources, the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNDOC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identified that the 
Commission was in urgent need of trained and qualified staff equipped with modern techniques.285 
Daily, economic criminals develop new techniques of hiding and laundering the proceeds they 
derive from their criminal activities. In grand corruption, vast amounts of money are involved which 
usually are hidden in foreign accounts. Lack of expertise and experience will result in investigations 
that are likely to have little evidential value to establish prima facie cases leading to 
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prosecutions.286 Thus, the ACC will need experts to trace and recover the assets lost through 
grand corruption. 
4.2.7 Public confidence sins 
The public confidence sin emerges when the public does not have trust and confidence in the 
ACC, due to a weak relationship between itself, civil society and the media.287 The Swazi ACC has 
taken efforts to build a rapport with civil society and the media. It has conducted public awareness 
programmes across all media houses and has worked with NGOs. In the corruption perception 
survey report, it was concluded, however, that there was still need to increase the education and 
awareness programmes to reach all sectors of civil society and that corruption studies should be 
incorporated in academic curricula.288   
These awareness programmes not only should include information on corruption and anti-
corruption mechanisms but also should include information on the mandate, functions and 
performance of the Commission.289 The ACC has been accused of being a „toothless dog‟ because 
the public has not been kept abreast of its performance. It has been viewed as non-effective since 
the media reported cases of alleged grand corruption often but the ACC was seen not to be 
responding. Also, the ACC has not had success in the court system. It was only in 2011, four years 
after its inception, that the ACC recorded its first conviction.290  
4.3 Successes 
The failures of the ACC obviously will surpass any success it has achieved. Despite it being 
plagued by the seven deadly sins, it has managed to sustain its existence. Acting in collaboration 
with the UNDP, it conducted a national perception survey of corruption in 2010 which, inter alia, 
highlighted the extent of the understanding of the concept of corruption in the country and the 
weaknesses of the Commission. The Commission has also developed a strategic plan for the 
period 2009-2012 which maps its main objectives, key areas of focus and which will be used to 
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gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the Commission. The one conviction it has secured in the 
midst of an epidemic of corruption and when the public had lost confidence in it has proven to the 
public the strengths of the investigation team. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The ACC is a well-intentioned body that looks good on paper but its objectives are difficult to 
implement. The combined effects of the seven deadly sins present it with a huge task with regard 
to curbing grand corruption. The efforts of the ACC in fighting against corruption under the present 
circumstances are meaningless and only portray it as an „island of integrity‟ in a sea of corruption. 
Corruption is entrenched as part of the system of governance in Swaziland. Without political will to 
back it up, the anti-corruption system will continue be inadequate. Its efforts to ferret out corruption 
in the civil service will be futile if the top is not committed to help. Proverbially, it is said in Africa 
that „fish starts rotting in the head‟.291 Reformation that will promote good governance, 
accountability and transparency in Swaziland is necessary 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Corruption in Swaziland has affected the political and socio-economic spheres of life and has 
contributed partly to the economic crisis the country is facing. Most deleterious is grand corruption, 
which not only has depleted the national treasury but also has affected the formulation of policy 
and legislation. The state, concerned about the effects of malfeasance and in efforts to mitigate 
them, has adopted a holistic strategy to combat corruption, including „watchdog‟ agencies, the 
media and civil society. Against the backdrop of the anti-corruption system, the levels of corruption 
should be low. However, they are on the rise. 
State policy on corruption is to expose, combat and eradicate it. The media reports have exposed 
corruption and have provoked outrage in society over its rising levels. Society has looked to the 
ACC, which is the pivot of the anti-corruption system, to contribute in the endeavour to root out 
corruption, but in vain. Society has since concluded that it is toothless. The state, too, has 
acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the ACC and the system in the realisation of its goal. In such 
situations, reform is inevitable. Lambsdorff argues that for reformation efforts to be successful, a 
country must acknowledge first that the tools at its disposal are imperfect.292  
This study has analysed the ACC, on whose strengths the system is dependent. Its failures, 
however, have contributed to the weaknesses of the system. The challenges facing the ACC are 
primarily based on lack of political will and good governance. Economic recovery can be achieved 
only by rectifying these administrative weaknesses. 
Corruption is not a problem that can be attacked in isolation by the agencies tasked to curb it. 
While criminal sanctions are necessary, they are not sufficient. The state authority has to be 
involved, as its commitment shapes the strategy employed. 
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5.2 Political will 
The leadership is seen to be involved in fighting corruption through the statements it issues, but 
such rhetoric is simply lip-service. Their spoken word is different from their actions. Tackling 
corruption in Swaziland will remain a problem if the relationship between the corrupt and the state 
is not differentiated.293 It hinders government from acting decisively and effectively on corruption 
issues as it shields the corrupt with impunity. The leadership should portray exemplary 
commitment by having zero tolerance for corruption. 
However, U4 emphasises that political will does not necessarily emanate from the leadership only, 
but can also come from the citizenry and the media.294 The governance of the country should 
enable the society to hold government accountable. Society should be empowered and 
encouraged to question government policy and actions through civil education and literacy on how 
they can contribute to holding leaders accountable.  
The international community can also assist the state in generating political will by withholding aid 
until effective reforms are implemented.295 The IMF has assisted in this regard by refusing to grant 
any loans to Swaziland until it manages its funds productively.296 The country has had a Fiscal 
Adjustment Roadmap for some time to help it recover from the economic crisis, but it has not been 
implemented. In such instance, outside pressure will not be adequate if the leadership is not ready 
to act decisively to remedy its problems. Without commitment from the leadership, the fight against 
corruption will not be won.   
5.3 Good governance 
Political will is dependent on good governance.297 Good governance is about reforming the 
institutional structures to enhance accountability, transparency and effectiveness to reduce 
corruption.298 The governance system of Swaziland is dual in nature as it encompasses both 
                                                            
293
 Joubert (2007: 142). 
294
 U4 „Why ACCs fail‟. 
295
 Rose-Ackerman (1999:180). 
296
 See 1.3 above. 
297
 U4 „Why ACCs fail‟. 
298
 Udombana (2003: 479). 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
traditional and modern structures. Even so, the doctrine of separation of powers should be adhered 
to strictly. 
The influence of the King in all arms of government should be decreased. The appointment of a 
majority of parliamentarians by the King has made them use the King as a shield against 
accountability. They have no sense responsibility to the citizenry. While the system does not 
accommodate political parties and bases eligibility for Parliament on individual merit, the individual 
has to be elected to power. The citizenry can decide at the polls whether an MP has served them 
well.299 However, in the status quo, the appointed politicians are not inclined to be accountable and 
have the best interest of the citizens at heart.  
Also, judicial processes should be allowed to take their course and people be held accountable if 
the fight against corruption is to be successful. Cabinet reshuffles are not sufficient in preventing 
and curbing corruption nor will the directives from the King act as a deterrent in future misconduct. 
The independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed and the rule of law upheld. 
 Good governance also entails effective and efficient management of funds. Thus, priority should 
be given to projects that enhance social development rather than pleasing one person. Equitable 
allocation of resources for the welfare of society will decrease corruption thus decreasing poverty. 
The government must adopt fiscal discipline to improve the economic situation and ensure that no 
funds are lost through the cracks.  
5.4 The legal framework 
The laws of the country govern and empower the pillars of the anti-corruption system. When poorly 
drafted, they will take away the teeth of the agencies. 
The ratification of the international instruments against corruption to which Swaziland is signatory 
could improve the quality of the domestic legislation. Being a mere signatory to them will not give 
the country a sense of obligation to implement their provisions. The instruments may also help 
cover the gaps in the existing legislation. 
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Successful investigation and prosecution of corruption cases is reliant on the speed and integrity of 
the ACC.300 Where its power is limited in some respects, it will hinder the effective implementation 
of anti-corruption efforts. The burden placed upon the investigators to establish a prima facie case 
before seizure of assets is limiting to their functions. The requirement should be reduced to 
establishing a reasonable suspicion as, at this stage, the investigations would still be ongoing. 301 
Thus, there would not be sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Also, POCA should be 
amended to increase the scope of asset recovery to include non-conviction based recovery.  
It is noted that the Witness Protection Bill and the Leadership Code of Conduct are still pending in 
parliament. Their swift enactment would contribute to the fight against grand corruption. 
5.5 The anti-corruption system 
The lack of defined and co-ordinated processes amongst the different pillars of the system has 
weakened the system. Understandably, the ACC may want the other agencies to deal with a 
matter they are seized with before it intervenes. However, this has filtered out some cases worth 
investigating. Its role and powers have to be clearly defined in this regard, whether it may initiate 
investigations independently, regardless of the any other agency (PAC or Commission of Inquiry) 
investigating the matter. This will remove the bureaucratic structure that has been created in 
initiating investigations into malfeasance. 
The independence of the different pillars is crucial to their operation. The judiciary should not be 
influenced either by the executive or the monarchy, and the office of the A-G must be given 
autonomy over its operations. Lack of resources implies poor institutional capacity. Thus, the pillars 
will always be ineffective in executing their functions. The budgets allocated to these bodies should 
be reviewed to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in fighting corruption. Retaining of experts in the 
each of the pillars should be made a priority. Special training must be given to the judiciary 
(prosecutors and judges), ACC investigators and auditors. 
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Government should consider strengthening its partnership with NGOs in the prevention of 
corruption.302 The government could increase transparency by including them in discussions of 
accountability and anti-corruption procedures.303 In this regard, it should make available public 
policy information without any requirement placed on the requestor to show a cause of interest in 
the information.304 The speculations on the E2,4 billion loan from South Africa by the media 
resulting in their chastisement by the King would have been avoided if government had issued a 
statement on its progress.305 Society could rely only on South African reports for information on the 
progress of the negotiations as the Swazi government was silent. The society would want to be 
interested in policies in which they will be involved. When society has a sense of ownership in the 
strategy, its members participate in finding a solution. The government must not create conditions 
where one party is suspect of the others‟ motives and intentions. The relationship between 
government and the citizens has to be one of trust.  
In its preventative measures, the ACC could raise awareness about grand corruption, its dangers 
and how it affects the society.306 It may also draw the relation between grand corruption and money 
laundering to highlight the magnitude of the effects it has, thus increasing awareness amongst the 
financial and non-financial institutions on the reporting of politically exposed persons. As such, the 
institutions will be vigilant in checking and reporting cases of grand corruption. Also such 
awareness should be extended to the government structures and the politicians themselves, 
especially persons entrusted with any discretionary power, inclusive of traditional structures. 
Moreover, the educational topics should also promote integrity and ethical conduct, particularly 
amongst the youth as it is the future generation of leaders.307 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The response of the state to the fight against corruption will remain a good policy on paper but 
difficult to implement if the state does not support it. To achieve sustainable development, political 
will and good governance are imperative. Without them, the pillars of the anti-corruption system will 
remain inadequate in curbing grand corruption. Instead, their inadequacy will weaken the anti-
corruption system further, resulting in more funds losses and hindering the recovery of the country 
from the economic crisis.  
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